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A JURIDICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF REGULATION NUMBER 9 OF 2017 REGARDING THE PROHIBITION ON CONCURRENT POSITIONS HELD BY NATIONAL POLICE MEMBERS AS COMMISSIONERS OF PAYMENT SERVICE PROVIDER COMPANIES

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to analyze the legal implications and potential conflicts of interest regarding dual identity or role alignment when an active police officer, specifically the Head of Sub-Directorate for Fiscal, Monetary, and Foreign Exchange (Kasubdit Fismondev) of DITRESKRIMSUS Polda Kalteng, serves as a commissioner in a Payment Service Provider (PJP) company. The analysis strictly evaluates this phenomenon against the Chief of Indonesian National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017 concerning Business Operations by Members of the Indonesian National Police. Using a normative juridical research method with conceptual, statutory, and analytical approaches, this study examines the clear structural overlap between law enforcement powers and private commercial operations. The findings indicate that such positioning violates Article 2 Paragraph (2) Letter c regarding power-scope business restrictions and Article 3 concerning the abuse of official authority. The study concludes that stricter enforcement by the Internal Affairs Division (Bid Propam) through the Business Assessment Team mechanism is legally compulsory to prevent structural conflicts of interest.

Keywords: *Perkap No. 9 of 2017, Fismondev, Payment Service Provider, Conflict of Interest, Police Business Restrictions.*

INTRODUCTION

Law serves as a fundamental instrument for maintaining social order, preserving institutional integrity, and ensuring balance within society. As a normative system, the law performs essential functions by protecting public interests, regulating individual and institutional conduct, and preventing social conflicts as well as abuses of authority[1]. In the context of the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the enforcement of professional integrity is governed through a comprehensive framework of internal regulations, including the Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017 concerning Business Activities of Police Personnel[2]. This

[1] Dinda ayu Arini Chaniago et al., "Police Professional Ethics in Law Enforcement in Indonesia," *UNISKA LAW REVIEW* 6, no. 1 (2026): 1–22, https://doi.org/10.32503/ulr.v6i1.8200.

[2] Apri Setiawan and Riswadi Riswadi, "Legal Review of the Indonesian National Police Code of Ethics in Ministerial Regulation Number 7 of 2022 Concerning the Code of Professional Ethics and the Police Code of Ethics Commission of the Republic of Indonesia," paper presented at Proceedings of the 4th International Conference on Law, Social Sciences, Economics, and Education, ICLSSEE 2024, 25 May 2024, Jakarta, Indonesia, *Proceedings of the 4th International*

regulation represents a form of positive law (*ius constitutum*) that remains legally applicable and functions as a preventive legal instrument to restrict police officers from engaging in activities that may give rise to conflicts of interest. Consequently, the regulation seeks to strengthen accountability, professionalism, and institutional integrity while enhancing public trust in the Indonesian National Police as a law enforcement institution[3].

In empirical legal practice, conflicts of interest may arise when an active Indonesian National Police (Polri) officer simultaneously holds a position in a private commercial company. One example is a Head of the Fiscal, Monetary, and Foreign Exchange Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev) at the Directorate of Special Criminal Investigation (DITRESKRIMSUS) of the Central Kalimantan Regional Police who also serves as a commissioner of a Payment Service Provider (PSP) company. From a regulatory perspective, the Fiscal, Monetary, and Foreign Exchange Sub-Directorate is responsible for investigating and enforcing laws related to banking, fiscal matters, and financial transactions. At the same time, a Payment Service Provider operates within the financial services and payment system industry, which may fall within the supervisory and investigative scope of the same sub-directorate. This overlapping role creates a potential conflict of interest that may affect the principles of impartiality, professional ethics, and public trust in law enforcement institutions[4]

Concurrent positions have the potential to weaken the rule of law and undermine substantive justice by blurring the distinction between the roles of regulator or law enforcement authority and corporate operator. This article aims to examine the effectiveness of Indonesian National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017 in mitigating conflicts of interest arising from such overlapping authority through a juridical analysis[5]

From a theoretical perspective, the effectiveness of a legal regulation is not determined solely by its formal legal validity, but also by its ability to influence the behavior of law enforcement officials in practice. According to Soerjono Soekanto's Theory of Legal Effectiveness, the implementation of law is influenced by five main factors: the legal substance, law enforcement officers, supporting facilities, society, and legal culture. In the context of the prohibition on dual positions, Regulation of the Chief of the Indonesian National Police (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017 provides clear legal

Conference on Law, Social Sciences, Economics, and Education, ICLSSEE 2024, 25 May 2024, Jakarta, Indonesia, 2024, https://doi.org/10.4108/eai.25-5-2024.2349374.

[3] Yanto Sufriadi, "The Progress of Indonesian Law Enforcement Reform after 25 Years of the Reform Movement," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 51, no. 1 (2024): 28–54, https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2023.2268491.

[4] Anthonio Effan Sulaiman and Retno Kusumastuti, "Analisis Kinerja Komisi Kode Etik Polri: Sebuah Kajian Literatur," *Publisia: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Publik* 8, no. 1 (2023): 71–83, https://doi.org/10.26905/pjiap.v8i1.8712.

[5] Ahmad Arya Saputra et al., "Analisis Regulasi Larangan Rangkap Jabatan Dalam Pemerintahan Indonesia sebagai Dukungan Penerapan Good Corporate Governance," *Jurnal Ilmiah Wahana Pendidikan* 10, no. 14 (2024): 61–76, https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.13343212.

boundaries regarding the business activities that police personnel may or may not undertake. However, the main challenge lies in the integrity of law enforcement officers and the internal legal culture of the police institution, where ethical responsibilities may conflict with personal economic interests and institutional power[6].

The appointment of the Head of the Financial Monitoring and Development Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev) as a commissioner of a Payment Service Provider (PJP) company illustrates a structural conflict of interest. The position of Kasubdit Fismondev carries authority to investigate and supervise financial crimes. Holding a corporate position in a company that may become the subject of legal supervision creates a conflict between public duties and private interests. This situation may increase the risk of abuse of power, selective law enforcement, and weakened institutional impartiality. From the perspective of the sociology of law, such dual positions are inconsistent with the principles of good governance, particularly the principle of impartiality, because they may undermine public trust in law enforcement institutions[7].

The Indonesian National Police (Polri), whose primary mandate is to uphold the law and protect the public interest, may become vulnerable to conflicts of interest when its personnel develop competing loyalties to private business interests. Such situations can undermine the impartiality of law enforcement, reduce fair competition in the payment industry, and weaken public trust in police institutions. If left unaddressed, these conflicts may gradually erode the legitimacy and credibility of Polri. Therefore, this empirical juridical study aims to identify the regulatory gaps and implementation challenges of **Chief of Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017** regarding conflicts of interest[8]. Beyond examining ethical sanctions, this study seeks to propose improvements to a more independent, transparent, and accountable internal oversight system. Using a socio-legal approach, the study is expected to provide strategic recommendations for strengthening early warning mechanisms and internal checks and balances to prevent conflicts of interest and promote fair and accountable law enforcement in the financial sector[9].

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[6] Muhamad Irfan Florid and Nandang Sambas, "IMPLEMENTATION OF LAWS REGARDING ECONOMIC CRIME IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD IN LAW NUMBER 20 OF 2001 CONCERNING ERADICATION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS OF CORRUPTION," *Jurnal Pamator : Jurnal Ilmiah Universitas Trunojoyo* 16, no. 3 (2023): 578–89, https://doi.org/10.21107/pamator.v16i3.20934.

[7] Anwar Sunarjo and Riswadi Riswadi, "Legal Uncertainty for Police Members in the Limits of Positions Outside the Police," *Journal of World Science* 3, no. 12 (2024): 1587–96, https://doi.org/10.58344/jws.v3i12.1243.

[8] Ricky Efendi Sianipar and Theresia Oktavia Sadipung, "Enhancing Police Accountability: The Role and Challenges of Itwasum POLRI in Institutional Supervision," *Dinasti International Journal of Digital Business Management* 6, no. 2 (2025): 665–71, https://doi.org/10.38035/dijdbm.v6i2.4378.

[9] Sebastian Roché and Simon Varaine, "Losing Control Is Not an Option. Resource Allocation to Police Oversight Agencies in Western States," *Public Administration* 102, no. 3 (2024): 1095–118, https://doi.org/10.1111/padm.12966.

METHOD

This study employs a normative legal research approach, focusing on the analysis of legal norms contained in legislation and legal doctrines. The research applies two main approaches: the statutory approach, which examines the provisions of the Chief of Indonesian National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017, and the conceptual approach, which explores the concept of conflicts of interest within the framework of legal administration. Primary legal materials consist of Perkap No. 9 of 2017, while secondary legal materials include legal textbooks, scholarly journals, and other relevant academic publications. Legal materials were collected through a systematic library research method. The data were analyzed using a qualitative argumentative approach to evaluate the consistency between the applicable legal norms and the potential implications of police personnel's involvement in business activities[10].

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

1. Prohibition of Conflicts of Interest Within the Scope of Authority

Under Indonesian National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017**,** clear restrictions are established regarding the commercial activities that may be undertaken by police officers to preserve the integrity and impartiality of law enforcement. One of the fundamental provisions is stipulated in Article 2 paragraph (2) (c)**,** which states that *"members of the Indonesian National Police are prohibited from owning shares or capital in companies whose business activities fall within the scope of their official authority."* This provision is intended to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure that police officers perform their duties independently, objectively, and free from personal financial interests[11].

When applied to the position of Head of the Financial Monitoring and Development Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev) of the Directorate of Special Criminal Investigation (Ditreskrimsus) of the Central Kalimantan Regional Police (Polda Kalteng), this sub-directorate has the legal and operational authority to investigate alleged financial crimes, money laundering, foreign exchange violations, and payment system offences[12]

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[10] Tunggul Ansari Setia Negara, “Normative Legal Research in Indonesia: Its Originis and Approaches,” *Audito Comparative Law Journal (ACLJ)* 4, no. 1 (2023): 1–9, https://doi.org/10.22219/aclj.v4i1.24855.

[11] Dani Hayqal et al., “Enforcing the Professional and Police Codes of Ethics to Address Violations Committed by Police Officers,” *International Journal of Social Science Research and Review* 6, no. 5 (2023): 516–24, https://doi.org/10.47814/ijssrr.v6i5.1329.

[12] Hasrina Nurlaily, *Legal Construction of Civil Servant Investigator (CSI) Coordination Obligations to the Police in Investigating Money Laundering | AML/CFT Journal : The Journal of*

Meanwhile, Payment Service Providers (PSPs) operate within the digital payment ecosystem and fund transfer system, both of which are subject to strict regulatory and legal oversight. Serving as a Commissioner of a PSP, a position that is generally associated with ownership interests or strategic corporate control, is fundamentally inconsistent with Article 2 paragraph (2) letter (c). This creates an unavoidable structural conflict of interest because the PSP's business activities fall directly within the regulatory and supervisory scope of the Head of the Financial Services, Monetary, and Foreign Exchange Development Subdivision (Kasubdit Fismondev)[13]

The legal consequences of share ownership or holding a position as a commissioner by a structural official within the Directorate of Special Criminal Investigation create an inherent conflict of interest. From the perspective of progressive law and the sociology of policing, the integrity of law enforcement depends on maintaining institutional independence and a clear separation between law enforcement officials and entities that may become subjects of legal investigation. When the Head of the Financial Monitoring and Development Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev) owns shares in or serves as a commissioner of a Payment Service Provider (PJP), the objectivity of police discretion is significantly compromised. As a result, discretionary authority, which should be exercised solely to uphold the law and protect the public interest, becomes vulnerable to private interests aimed at safeguarding the business stability of the corporation with which the official is affiliated[14].

From a theoretical perspective, this institutional arrangement creates a structural barrier that reduces the effectiveness of economic criminal law enforcement. As the unit responsible for detecting white-collar crimes, the Financial Sector Monitoring, Development, and Investigation Unit (Fismondev) should operate with full institutional independence. However, its structural integration within the Financial Services Provider (PJP) may create conflicts of interest, particularly in investigating violations related to fund transfers and money laundering. Consequently, supervisory functions may become less objective and more vulnerable to institutional compromise[15]. This situation weakens the principles of justice, good governance, and impartial law enforcement.

Anti Money Laundering and Countering The Financing of Terrorism, n.d., accessed July 16, 2026, https://amlcftjournal.ppatk.go.id/index.php/jac/article/view/58?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[13] Sulaiman and Kusumastuti, "Analisis Kinerja Komisi Kode Etik Polri."

[14] Donny Widianto and Azis Budianto, *Reforming the Limits of Discretion and Strengthening the Police Code of Ethics in Achieving Justice in Law Enforcement | Jurnal Impresi Indonesia*, December 20, 2024, https://jii.rivierapublishing.id/index.php/jii/article/view/5731?utm_source=chatgpt.com.

[15] Katarzyna J. McNaughton, "The Variability and Clustering of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) – A Comparative Analysis of National Models of FIUs in Selected Western and Eastern (Post-Soviet) Countries," *Journal of Economic Criminology* 2 (December 2023): 100036, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeconc.2023.100036.

Furthermore, violations of National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017 may directly undermine public trust in the Indonesian National Police (Polri). When a police officer simultaneously performs law enforcement duties while holding interests in, or supervising, a private business entity, a conflict of interest may arise. This situation creates a public perception that law enforcement authority could be used to benefit particular commercial interests rather than to serve the public interest. Therefore, Article 2 paragraph (2) letter (c) of the Regulation functions as a preventive rule designed to avoid conflicts of interest and to ensure that public authority is not transformed into a tool for gaining advantages in the digital financial services market. Such preventive measures are widely recognised as an essential element of public integrity and good governance[16].

In addition, this dual role is inconsistent with the principles of good governance and the ethical standards governing police professionalism. The prohibition contained in Perkap No. 9 of 2017 is mandatory and does not depend on whether corruption or other criminal conduct has actually occurred. Instead, the regulation seeks to eliminate the possibility that official authority may be influenced by private interests. By separating public office from private business activities, the regulation protects institutional integrity, prevents abuse of power, and strengthens public confidence in law enforcement agencies. From a legal perspective, Perkap No. 9 of 2017 adopts a preventive regulatory approach rather than a punitive one. This means that the existence of a conflict of interest itself is considered a sufficient risk to institutional integrity, even if no criminal offence has yet been committed. The purpose of the regulation is to preserve the impartiality of police officers by preventing situations in which personal financial interests could influence official decision-making.

From the perspective of good governance**,** the separation between public authority and private economic interests is a fundamental principle. International governance standards consistently recognise that unmanaged conflicts of interest weaken accountability, reduce transparency, and diminish public trust in government institutions. In the context of policing, maintaining institutional independence is particularly important because police officers exercise coercive powers on behalf of the state. When those powers appear to intersect with private commercial interests, the legitimacy of law enforcement may be questioned, regardless of whether actual misconduct can be proven. Therefore, the prohibition contained in Article 2 paragraph (2) letter (c) should be interpreted not merely as an internal administrative rule but as an important legal safeguard to protect police neutrality, prevent regulatory capture, and maintain public confidence in the rule of law.

2. Potential Violations of the Principles Governing Business Activities

[16] Saputra et al., "Analisis Regulasi Larangan Rangkap Jabatan Dalam Pemerintahan Indonesia sebagai Dukungan Penerapan Good Corporate Governance."

In addition to restricting capital ownership in business sectors related to official duties, the regulation establishes ethical standards for police officers. Article 3 of Indonesian National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017 states that police officers engaged in business activities shall not: (a) interfere with their official duties, (b) use their official position or authority for private interests, or (c) use government facilities for business purposes[17]. If the Head of the Financial Services Monitoring and Development Subdivision (Kasubdit Fismondev) simultaneously serves as a Commissioner of a Payment Service Provider (PJP), there is a significant risk of violating Article 3(b). Holding both positions may create an actual or perceived conflict of interest because the officer's public position could provide indirect benefits to the private company. Such circumstances may lead to the perception that the company enjoys preferential treatment or legal protection from law enforcement authorities.

The abuse of public office is not limited to direct misuse of authority. It may also occur when a public official's position creates an unfair competitive advantage or implicit protection for a private business. Recent studies emphasize that unmanaged conflicts of interest can weaken public integrity, reduce institutional impartiality, and undermine public trust in law enforcement and governance[18]

From the perspective of the sociology of law, the appointment of an active police officer as a corporate commissioner may create what Pierre Bourdieu describes as *symbolic power*, which can undermine fair business competition. The authority associated with the police uniform and the position of Head of the Financial Security and Development Monitoring Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev) may be indirectly converted into an economic advantage, strengthening the company's bargaining position in dealing with business partners and competitors. This situation is inconsistent with Article 3(b) of Indonesian National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017, which prohibits the misuse of official authority for personal or private interests. The violation begins when the reputation and institutional authority of law enforcement are used to enhance corporate credibility and attract investors by creating the perception that the company enjoys stronger regulatory protection or influence[19]

Furthermore, a potential violation of Article 3(a), which prohibits interference with official duties, becomes difficult to avoid because of the significant division of cognitive workload. As the Head of the Financial Monitoring and Development Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev), the officer is required to maintain full attention in leading complex financial crime investigations. At the same time, serving as a commissioner requires the fulfillment of fiduciary duties,

[17] Chaniago et al., "Police Professional Ethics in Law Enforcement in Indonesia."
[18] Sianipar and Sadipung, "Enhancing Police Accountability."
[19] Sunarjo and Riswadi, "Legal Uncertainty for Police Members in the Limits of Positions Outside the Police."

including supervising the board of directors and ensuring the company's sound governance and business performance. These two positions involve different responsibilities and priorities, creating role conflict and divided attention that may reduce the officer's managerial effectiveness and weaken the performance of law enforcement functions[20].

From the perspective of progressive law, violations of the principles governing outside business activities may create opportunities for **regulatory capture**, a situation in which law enforcement institutions gradually become influenced by the industries they are responsible for supervising. When a tactical officer in the Financial Services Monitoring and Development Sub-Directorate (Subdit Fismondev) has financial or personal interests in a Payment Service Provider (PJP), the objectivity of policies for preventing financial crimes may be compromised. As a result, intelligence strategies and financial crime risk assessments could be shaped to protect private business interests rather than the public interest. This condition weakens the independence and impartiality expected from law enforcement institutions.

Another important concern relates to the use of official facilities, as prohibited under Article 3(c) of the Chief of Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017. Official facilities include not only physical assets, such as government vehicles and offices, but also confidential information, criminal intelligence databases, and internal communication networks. The misuse of these resources occurs when public officials use privileged information or institutional access to benefit their private companies. Such practices create unfair information advantages for certain businesses and constitute an abuse of public authority for personal commercial gain.

More broadly, allowing conflicts of interest in business activities may undermine the integrity of the integrated criminal justice system. When the public perceives that law enforcement officers are closely connected to private corporations, trust in the neutrality and fairness of the police is significantly reduced. Consequently, legal actions against other Payment Service Providers may be viewed as selective enforcement or unfair business competition instead of impartial law enforcement. Therefore, the prohibition contained in Article 3 of Perkap No. 9 of 2017 should be strictly enforced to preserve the independence, credibility, and integrity of the Indonesian National Police in safeguarding economic justice

3. Obligation of the Assessment Mechanism and the Role of the Professional and Security Division (Propam)

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[20] María Ángeles López-Cabarcos et al., "How to Prevent Hostile Behaviors and Emotional Exhaustion among Law Enforcement Professionals: The Negative Spiral of Role Conflict," *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health* 20, no. 1 (2023): 863, https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20010863.

From a procedural and legal perspective, members of the Indonesian National Police (Polri) who intend to engage, or are already engaged, in business activities are required to comply with a formal reporting mechanism to ensure transparency and accountability. Specifically[21]:

a. Article 4 (1) stipulates that every Polri member must submit a written notification regarding any business activity to the Business Assessment Team.
b. Article 5 (2) (b) provides that, at the Regional Police (Polda) level, the Head of the Professional and Security Affairs Division (Kabid Propam) serves as the Chairperson of the Business Assessment Team, ensuring that business-related activities of police personnel are reviewed in accordance with professional ethics and institutional regulations.

The mandatory reporting mechanism demonstrates that the regulation does not impose an absolute prohibition on business involvement by police personnel. Instead, it establishes a preventive governance system based on transparency, accountability, and institutional oversight. By requiring written disclosure to the Business Assessment Team, the regulation enables the institution to identify potential conflicts of interest before they affect the impartiality or professionalism of police officers. This approach reflects the principles of good governance, emphasizing integrity and ethical accountability within public institutions.

Furthermore, the appointment of the Head of Propam as Chairperson of the Business Assessment Team reinforces Propam's strategic role in safeguarding ethical standards and professional conduct within Polri. As the internal supervisory body, Propam is responsible not only for enforcing disciplinary measures but also for ensuring that members' business activities remain consistent with the Police Code of Ethics and institutional integrity. This oversight mechanism strengthens public trust by minimizing opportunities for conflicts of interest and maintaining accountability in police administration

Based on the applicable regulatory framework, when a report concerning the dual position of the Head of the Financial Monitoring and Development Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev) as a commissioner of a Financial Service Provider (PJP) is submitted to the Business Assessment Team (TPU) of the Central Kalimantan Regional Police, the TPU is required to assess its compliance with the relevant regulations. Since the PJP falls within the category of prohibited business activities under Article 2 paragraph (2) letter (c) of Police Regulation No. 9 of 2017, the Head of the Professional and Internal Affairs Division (Kabid Propam), as the chair of the TPU, should issue a formal recommendation stating that the business activity is not permitted or must be immediately terminated. Failure to comply with

[21] Era Indriana et al., "Implementation of Police Regulation Number 7 of 2022 Concerning the Professional Code of Ethics for the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia," *Jurnal Ilmiah Penegakan Hukum* 11, no. 2 (2024): 121–28, https://doi.org/10.31289/jiph.v11i2.11224.

this recommendation may result in disciplinary sanctions and professional code of ethics penalties in accordance with Article 7 of Police Regulation No. 9 of 2017[22]

The existence of the Business Assessment Team (TPU), led by the Head of the Professional and Internal Affairs Division (Propam) of the Regional Police, reflects an internal control mechanism that functions to prevent and correct ethical violations. Through the written reporting requirement stipulated in Article 4 paragraph (1), the institution can identify potential misconduct at an early stage. This reporting obligation is not merely an administrative procedure but also serves as a legal and ethical review mechanism. For example, when a strategic official, such as the Head of the Financial Monitoring and Development Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev), reports an affiliation with a Payment Service Provider (PJP), Propam has the authority to assess whether the affiliation could create a conflict of interest or compromise the official's independence in carrying out law enforcement duties[23]

From the perspective of administrative law, a negative recommendation issued by the Head of the Professional Assessment Team (TPU) within the Professional and Security Division (Propam) is internally binding on members of the Indonesian National Police (Polri). The TPU's assessment is not intended to limit an officer's personal financial interests but to protect institutional integrity, organizational propriety, and public confidence. If the TPU concludes that a police officer's private business is directly related to the jurisdiction of the Financial and Economic Investigation Unit (Subdit Fismondev), allowing the officer to continue such business creates a conflict of interest and constitutes a failure to comply with institutional obligations. In this context, Propam functions as the guardian of professional ethics by prioritizing the prevention of conflicts of interest over individual economic interests[24].

Furthermore, ignoring a formal TPU recommendation to discontinue a private business should not be viewed merely as an administrative violation. Instead, it may constitute insubordination and a serious breach of the Police Code of Ethics. Such non-compliance activates disciplinary and ethical enforcement mechanisms under the applicable police regulations, including proceedings before the Police Professional Code of Ethics Commission (Komisi Kode Etik Polri/KKEP). These proceedings assess whether police officers remain committed

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[22] Halawa, A., Zulyadi, R., & Maswandi. (2024). Implementation of police regulation on dismissal without honor of Indonesian National Police members violating the code of ethics. National Journal of Multidisciplinary Research and Development, 9(1), 38–43.

[23] Devi Nurmalasari et al., "Do Internal Controls Improve Integrity? A Comparative Study of Central and Regional Governments," *Jurnal Tata Kelola Dan Akuntabilitas Keuangan Negara* 11, no. 1 (2025): 139–56, https://doi.org/10.28986/jtaken.v11i1.2038.

[24] Indriana et al., "Implementation of Police Regulation Number 7 of 2022 Concerning the Professional Code of Ethics for the National Police of the Republic of Indonesia."

to the ethical standards and oath of office expected of members of the Indonesian National Police[25].

From a broader law enforcement perspective, the consistency of Propam in addressing dual-position violations significantly influences the credibility of external law enforcement. Public confidence in the police may decline if the institution strictly enforces the law against citizens and corporations while tolerating ethical violations committed by its own personnel. Therefore, the enforcement of TPU recommendations regarding business conflicts of interest represents an important indicator of institutional accountability, integrity, and good governance within the police organization.

Consistent enforcement of ethical sanctions also creates a deterrent effect for other police officers. It demonstrates that professional authority cannot be used to justify commercial activities that conflict with official duties. Consequently, Propam's supervisory role extends beyond enforcing internal disciplinary procedures; it also serves to preserve public trust in the integrity and impartiality of law enforcement, particularly in the field of economic and financial crime[26]

From the perspective of administrative law, the prohibition on holding concurrent positions aims to uphold integrity, impartiality, accountability, and good governance within public institutions. As public officials, police officers must perform their duties free from personal interests. Owning or managing a private business related to their official responsibilities may create conflicts of interest, leading to the misuse of authority, preferential treatment, or personal financial gain.

Within the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the Professional Assessment Team (TPU) serves as a preventive mechanism to identify ethical risks and maintain institutional integrity. TPU recommendations are important instruments for ensuring compliance with professional standards. Failure to follow these recommendations may constitute a violation of administrative obligations, professional ethics, and police discipline, which can be reviewed by the Police Professional Code of Ethics Commission (KKEP).

For example, a Head of Unit (Kanit) in the Financial and Economic Investigation Directorate (Subdit Fismondev) who owns a financial technology (fintech) company while investigating fintech-related crimes faces a clear conflict of interest. If the TPU recommends that the officer relinquish ownership but the recommendation is ignored, the officer's conduct may compromise the impartiality of criminal investigations and undermine public confidence in law enforcement. This example highlights the importance of internal oversight by the TPU and the Professional and Security Affairs Division (Propam) in preventing ethical

[25] Sulaiman and Kusumastuti, "Analisis Kinerja Komisi Kode Etik Polri."

[26] Hayqal et al., "Enforcing the Professional and Police Codes of Ethics to Address Violations Committed by Police Officers."

misconduct, protecting institutional integrity, and maintaining public trust in the fairness and credibility of law enforcement.

CONCLUSION

From both a normative-textual and socio-legal perspective, the concurrent holding of the position of Head of the Fiscal, Monetary, and Foreign Exchange Monitoring Sub-Directorate (Kasubdit Fismondev) within the Directorate of Special Criminal Investigation (DITRESKRIMSUS) of the Central Kalimantan Regional Police (Polda Kalteng) and the position of Commissioner in a Payment Service Provider (Penyedia Jasa Pembayaran/PJP) company is unequivocally prohibited and fundamentally inconsistent with the provisions of Indonesian National Police Regulation (Perkap) No. 9 of 2017. Such dual office-holding creates a clear and substantial overlap between the authority to supervise and enforce monetary and fiscal laws and the commercial activities of a private business entity that falls within the scope of regulatory oversight. This situation gives rise to an inherent conflict of interest that undermines the principles of impartiality, independence, and professional integrity that are indispensable to law enforcement institutions.

In conclusion, the prohibition against dual office-holding should not be viewed merely as a matter of administrative compliance, but rather as a concrete manifestation of the commitment to safeguarding the institutional integrity of the Indonesian National Police from undue influence by private commercial interests. Failure to effectively resolve conflicts of interest within a strategic unit such as the Fiscal, Monetary, and Foreign Exchange Monitoring Sub-Directorate (Subdit Fismondev) would establish a detrimental precedent by legitimizing the convergence of state law enforcement authority with private commercial interests. Accordingly, the progressive enforcement of internal regulations by the Business Assessment Team (Tim Penilai Usaha) of the Central Kalimantan Regional Police is imperative and non-negotiable to ensure that the Indonesian National Police (Polri) continues to uphold its constitutional mandate as an independent, objective, and trustworthy institution in the administration of justice, both in the eyes of the law and the public.

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